Interpenetration

[Riou Sora]

Following read essays of Russell, Lichtenstein... I'm interested in so-called "theory of interpenetration" which it seemly appeared in all history of philosophical schools (include Buddhism, Taoism,... in Asia too)

The doctrine of interpenetration, according to which different things are not really separate, but are merely so conceived by the analytic intellect, is to be found in every mystic, eastern or western, from Parmenides to Mr. Bradley

I hope to listen you guys comments on this matter. And by the way, if you guys came across such good articles/books/essays on this subject, please provide me links.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Riou, the only individuals who might be interested in this topic are either mystics, idealists or DM-fans. Since they are scared stiff of taking me on, I am prepared to predict that not one of them will post on this topic.

Hope I'm wrong; I need another good laugh.

[Amoeba]

Well, you could argue that folks like Quine and Brandom adhere to such a view in a broad sense, which is related to the Hegelian notion of 'every determination is a negation'. Quine's web of beliefs and Brandom's holistic view of language specifically contain these elements.

Holistic thinking in general is not totally useless as long as it's not reified but merely used heuristically. As Gould for example notes:

Dialectical materialism is not, and never has been, a programmatic method for solving particular physical problems. Rather, a dialectical analysis provides an overview and a set of warning signs against particular forms of dogmatism and narrowness of thought. It tells us, "Remember that history may leave an important trace. Remember that being and becoming are dual aspects of nature. Remember that conditions change and that the conditions necessary to the initiation of some process may be destroyed by the process itself. Remember to pay attention to real objects in time and space and not lose them in utterly idealized abstractions. Remember that qualitative effects of context and interaction may be lost when phenomena are isolated". And above all else, "Remember that all the other caveats are only reminders and warning signs whose application to different circumstances of the real world is contingent."

[Furthermore], when presented as guidelines for a philosophy of change, not as dogmatic precepts true by fiat, the three classical laws of dialectics embody a holistic vision that views change as interaction among components of complete systems, and sees the components themselves not as a priori entities, but as both products and inputs to the system. Thus, the law of "interpenetrating opposites" records the inextricable interdependence of components: the "transformation of quantity to quality" defends a systems-based view of change that translates incremental inputs into alterations of state; and the "negation of negation" describes the direction given to history because complex systems cannot revert exactly to previous states.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectical_materialism

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Amoeba:

Well, you could argue that folks like Quine and Brandom adhere to such a view in a broad sense, which is related to the Hegelian notion of 'every determination is a negation'. Quine's web of beliefs and Brandom's holistic view of language specifically contain these elements.

This is a throw-away remark found in one of Spinoza's letters, which Hegel put to use in his mangling of Aristotelian logic -- and which, incidentally, neither Spinoza nor Hegel even so much as attempted to prove -- or even justify. [So much for Hegel's philosophy being 'presumptionless'!]

As far as I can determine, no one since has attempted to fill in the gaps. I'm not sure, either, that Quine can be recruited to this odd view of 'language', despite his 'web of beliefs' metaphor.

And, despite what Gould maintains, 'holistic thinking' is far too confused to give it a second thought:

http://www.anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2011%2002.htm

http://www.anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2011_01.htm

[Riou Sora]

Well, I am interested not in learning it, but I want to know how, why and through what such as doctrine has survived too long in history of philosophy. It is one of the reasons why there is no such thing as difference of Eastern & Western philosophy.

Main targets of Rosa's two essays were DM-classicists, but I am curious more about its characters under various forms in history of philosophical theories. And how many persons [as Russell] have pointed it out.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

The simple explanation, Riou, is as Marx noted: the ideas of the ruling class are always the ruling ideas. An a priori dogma like this, derived from thought alone (or, to be more honest, from the alleged meaning of a handful of words), supposedly revealing to us profound truths about the fundamental structure of reality (that is, in this case, that all of it, or parts of it, are holistic or are 'inter-linked), unavailable to the senses.

As I have pointed out elsewhere:

The founders of our movement weren't workers; they came from a class that educated their children in religion, the classics and philosophy. This tradition taught that behind appearances there lies a hidden (often 'spiritual') world, accessible to thought alone, which is more real than the material world we see around us.

As noted above, this way of seeing things was invented by ruling-class ideologues. They concocted it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society that is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep 'order' in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to win over the majority --, or, at least, a significant proportion of "opinion formers" (bureaucrats, judges, bishops, generals, 'intellectuals', philosophers, editors, teachers, administrators, etc., etc.) to the view that the present order either (1) Works for their benefit, (2) Preserves and defends 'civilised values', (3) Is ordained of the 'gods', or (4) Is 'natural' and thus cannot be fought against, reformed or negotiated with.

Hence, a world-view that helps rationalise one or more of the above is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling "in the same old way". While the content of this aspect of ruling-class ideology may have altered in line with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth (about this 'hidden world' underlying appearances) can be ascertained by thought alone, and can therefore be imposed on reality dogmatically and aprioristically.

["Aprioristically" means that the supposed truth of certain ideas can be inferred in advance of any supporting evidence. A genuine a priori idea might, for example, be the following: despite the fact that you will never have experienced this, and never will, you know that ten billion marbles added to twenty billion marbles will total thirty billion marbles (although, I prefer to call this the application of a rule). A bogus a priori idea would involve, for instance, an attempt to prove the existence of 'god' from 'his' definition (as Anselm attempted). Yet another would involve an endeavour to show that everything is governed by 'contradictions', based solely on a similarly 'linguistic argument' -- or, in fact, verbal conjuring trick --, as Hegel himself tried to do.]

http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/

So, the non-worker founders of our movement -- who had been educated from an early age to believe there was just such a hidden world lying behind appearances, and which governed everything in existence --, when they became revolutionaries looked for 'logical' principles in that abstract world that told them that change was inevitable, and was part of the 'cosmic order'. Enter dialectics, courtesy of the dogmatic pronouncements of that ruling-class mystic, Hegel. The dialectical classicists latched onto this theory and were happy to impose it on the world (upside down, or the "right way up"), since, to them, because of their education, it seemed quite natural and uncontroversial to do so. After all, that is what 'genuine' philosophers do -- or, so these dialecticians had been socialised to believe.

Of course, if the facts end up contradicting DM, they can safely be ignored (indeed, as we saw earlier), since this hidden world of invisible 'essences' not only "contradicts" appearances (so we are told), it is more real than anything genuinely material.

[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

[In fact, DM-theorists even tell us that matter itself is an "abstraction", and that they prefer "intelligent Idealists"!]

And, that is why DM-fans bury their heads in the sand, ignoring anything and everything that contradicts their theory. Like genuine religionists, their faith lies in this invisible world and the promises it holds out; the dialectical equivalent of 'pie-in-the-sky'.

This shouldn't surprise us, either; after all, these ideas had been lifted from the works of a Christian Mystic!

The same argument (suitably modified) applies to other cultures and philosophies -- I can add more details if you so require.

[Riou Sora]

This paragraph is one of my favored argument coming from Rosa which I read long ago. I hope you can add more details, of course.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I have tried to say much more here:

http://www.anti-dialectics.co.uk/Res..._of_Twelve.htm

When my research into the ruling-class ideologies dominant in China, Babylonia, Egypt and India is compete, I will add more details about those cultures.

However, you will find some details in Appendix One to Essay Two:

http://www.anti-dialectics.co.uk/pag...m#Appendix-One

I have also inserted links in the above to other Essays at my site that add even more detail.

[Amoeba]

This paragraph is one of my favored argument coming from Rosa which I read long ago. I hope you can add more details, of course.

Yeah, except her historical meta-narrative is inherently flawed, as there were plenty of 'ruling class' philosophers who were materialists, from the Epicureans to the Atomists and Lokayata and Wang Chong.

The counter-argument might be that they weren't materialists in the sense that she's a materialist, but then that basically puts everyone in the category of idealism except her and the people she likes.

I've already debated her on this issue a couple times and not much came out of it, but just be aware of the problems there.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Amoeba:

Yeah, except her historical meta-narrative is inherently flawed, as there were plenty of 'ruling class' philosophers who were materialists, from the Epicureans to the Atomists and Lokayata and Wang Chong.

Not really, since their materialism was philosophical, based on thought alone (and hence on distorted language) and so it falls within the generalisations I posted above.

The counter-argument might be that they weren't materialists in the sense that she's a materialist, but then that basically puts everyone in the category of idealism except her and the people she likes.

It isn't a question of what I 'like' but what you can show. Sweeping allegations, not based on anything I have asserted here, or elsewhere, might impress you when you read it back to yourself, but what you require is detailed argument and evidence taken from my essays, not your fantasies.

I've already debated her on this issue a couple times and not much came out of it, but just be aware of the problems there.

And you did the same then; you made stuff up, and attacked that easy target, too.

Can we all do this?

OK.

Amoeba is a Tibetan head-hunter, keen to promote Japanese Imperialism and the US Tea Party...

[Riou Sora]

Yeah, except her historical meta-narrative is inherently flawed, as there were plenty of 'ruling class' philosophers who were materialists, from the Epicureans to the Atomists and Lokayata and Wang Chong.

The counter-argument might be that they weren't materialists in the sense that she's a materialist, but then that basically puts everyone in the category of idealism except her and the people she likes.

I've already debated her on this issue a couple times and not much came out of it, but just be aware of the problems there.

I'm aware of her lacking something, I put word "lacking" or "developing" than "flawed". I was curious how she will develop her argument in future. I am waiting for that... I think that because her argument like that many people haven't still accepted it, I have tried to bring her arguments to Vietnam, but many philosophical researchers only found it "interesting" than worthy for seriously study.

Amoeba is a Tibetan head-hunter, keen to promote Japanese Imperialism and the US Tea Party...

What are you talking about? Is Rupert Read also supporter of Tea Party? And what does it mean "Tibetan head-hunter"?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Riou:

What are you talking about? Is Rupert Read also supporter of Tea Party? And what does it mean "Tibetan head-hunter"?

You need to read what preceded those comments:

you [Amoeba] made stuff up, and attacked that easy target, too.

Can we all do this? [That is, can we all make things up?]

OK.

Amoeba is a Tibetan head-hunter, keen to promote Japanese Imperialism and the US Tea Party...

I deliberately made things up about Amoeba, to see if he liked it.

Not sure where you got 'Rupert Read from', though.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

The approach I intend to take will be (partly) based, for example, on the following: Barnes (2009), Havelock (1983), Kahn (1994, 2003), Lloyd (1971), and Seligman (1962):

Barnes, J. (2009), Truth, Etc. Six Lectures On Ancient Logic (Oxford University Press).

Havelock, E. (1983), 'The Linguistic Task Of The Presocratics', in Robb (1982), pp.7-82.

Kahn, C. (1994), Anaximander And the Origin Of Greek Cosmology (Hackett Publishing)

--------, (2003), The Verb 'Be' In Ancient Greek (Hackett Publishing).

Lloyd, G. (1971), Polarity And Analogy. Two Types Of Argument In Early Greek Thought (Cambridge University Press).

Seligman, P. (1962), The Apeiron Of Anaximander. A Study In The Origin And Function Of Metaphysical Ideas (The Athlone Press).

Robb, K. (1983) (ed.), Language And Thought In Early Greek Philosophy (Monist Library of Philosophy).

Typified by these words from Plato:

"If mind and true opinion are two distinct classes, then I say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas unperceived by sense, and apprehended only by the mind; if, however, as some say, true opinion differs in no respect from mind, then everything that we perceive through the body is to be regarded as most real and certain. But we must affirm that to be distinct, for they have a distinct origin and are of a different nature; the one is implanted in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is always accompanied by true reason, the other is without reason; the one cannot be overcome by persuasion, but the other can: and lastly, every man may be said to share in true opinion, but mind is the attribute of the gods and of very few men. Wherefore also we must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is granted to intelligence only." [Plato (1997c), 51e-52a, pp.1254-55. I have used the on-line version here. Bold emphases added. The published version (referenced below) translates the third set of highlighted words as follows: "It is indivisible -- it cannot be perceived by the senses at all -- and it is the role of the understanding to study it." Cornford renders it thus: "[It is] invisible and otherwise imperceptible; that, in fact, which thinking has for its object." (Cornford (1997), p.192.)]

Plato, (1997a), Complete Works, edited by John Cooper (Hackett Publishing).

--------, (1997c), Timaeus, in Plato (1997a), pp.1224-91.

Cornford, F. (1997), Plato's Cosmology. The Timaeus Of Plato (Hackett Publishing Company).

More to follow...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Some of these ideas have been developed by a supporter of my site, ChrisK, who posted the following over at RevLeft a few years ago (the software here can't cope with Greek words that Chris used (and substituted "?" for them!), but I have added a link at the end so that comrades can check the original -- I have now transliterated these Greek letters into Latin script English, thus removing all those '????'s!):

I just turned this in. Its my final paper for my Philosophy of Religion class. I wrote it on the question of being. Due to being allowed only five double spaced pages, the paper contains some vast oversimplifications of the argument itself. Even so I think its a good summary of the argument that the paper attempts to present. Thanks to Rosa for recommending the book by Kahn and for pointing out a few arguments:

The philosophy of religion is a subject that hinges upon the answering of questions of human existence; answering the questions of ontology. Central to ontology, and, thus, the philosophy of religion, is the question of being. Charles Kahn put it best when he wrote:

the systematic development of the concept of Being in Greek philosophy from Parmenides to Aristotle, and then in a more mechanical way from the Stoics to Plotinus, relies on the pre-existing disposition of the language to make a very general and diversified use of the verb eimi. Furthermore, insofar as the notions expressed by on, eimi, and ousia in Greek underlie the doctrines of Being, substance, essence, and existence, in Latin and Arabic, and in modern philosophy from Descartes to Heidegger and perhaps to Quine, we may say that the usage of the Greek verb be studies here forms the historical basis for the ontological tradition of the West, as the very term "ontology" suggests. (Kahn, 1)

By being, the philosopher means the innate state in which one exists, their personal character. If the question of being were to be shown as a nonsensical question, then ontology and the philosophy of religion will become based on nonsense.

In fact, the question of being can be shown to be nonsense, based on the fact that it is a distortion of the verb to be. This is, of course, contingent on the idea that ordinary language is the proper framework for understanding language as used in philosophy. Additionally, it has to be shown how the verb to be was distorted into the noun being.

Ordinary language is indeed the way to look at language as used by philosophers. This is due to how a word gains its meaning. A word obtains its meaning through its use in a social interaction. Words cannot obtain their meaning through some a priori knowledge of the words, for it that were true then words meanings would not change over time. Rather, by existing through human interaction, words meanings can begin to change over time. Further, people assimilate words through social interaction. How else does a child learn to speak? It can only be through hearing the words and seeing the context in which they are spoken. As one learns more of the language, then words can be used to describe the meaning of other words.

Considering this to be the case, ordinary language is the basis for all other forms of language. Specialized languages, like those used in the sciences, expand ordinary language to suit their specialized needs. This is most often done by creating new words through Greek or Latin roots. It is also done by expanding an old concept to a modern form, as was done with the word “atom.” Atom originally was just the small thing that made up everything else and the word was then used, by physicists, to describe the tiny building blocks of all material things so far observed.

Other than ordinary and specialized languages, there is a third type of language used; philosophical. Philosophical language is a language created through the nominalization of verbs and then, as nouns, giving them a life of their own. By changing the verb to a noun, the philosopher can change the meaning of a word and give it a new meaning. This can be demonstrated through a simple analysis of the words themselves.

Concerning the question of being, the distortion through nominalization occurred in Ancient Greece. From the Greek on using the Greek alphabet, one can see how being stopped being an action and became its own topic. When looking at on, "it is in nominalized form, as articular participle and abstract noun, that the verb be serves not only to express but also to thematize the concept of Being as a distinct topic for philosophical reflection." (Kahn, 453) Thus, we must look at its nominalized forms in order to understand in what way it has been changed.

The first nominalized form of on is onta, which is its articular participle. In this form, “the denotation of the participle is highly ambiguous, as Aristotle observed. In the first place ta onta or “what is” means what is the case, facts or events that actually occur or will occur… In the second place, ta ontameans what is in the locative-existential use of eimi, things which exist, things which are present, or which are to be found somewhere.” (Kahn 457) Here it can be seen that by exploiting the ambiguity of onta, philosophers are able to take the existential use of the word and treat it like it has a life of its own. This will be discussed in depth later, for now it is sufficient to see what part of the word is distorted.

The second nominalized form of on is ousia, the abstract noun. This form has a much clearer change made to it by philosophers, due to being able to trace the history of the words actual distortion. “Ousia occurs in Herodotus and is common in Attic prose but only in the sense of ‘property’… There is no direct connection between this idiomatic use of ousia (reflecting on the possessive construction of eimi with the dative) and the more technical sense of ousia which [one] find[s] in Plato and Aristotle.” (Kahn, 458) If there is no direct connection between the two uses of the word, then one would have to have been made up. In fact, ousia had been distorted by Plato in order to answer “what is” sort of questions. As it is understood, Plato’s use of ousia can only be used for his Forms or Aristotle’s Essences. (Kahn 461) Plato changed ousia from being a word that reflects possession to being an actual quality of human possession, such as possessing a soul. This is a new use of a word that was abstracted by philosophers.

Of course, just claiming that the words are abstracted from the ordinary words is not damning evidence. What is more important is the process behind the actual abstracting of the words. “This they do by re-writing predicative sentences as propositions expressing identity, and it this which transforms the general terms they contain into the names of abstract particulars.” (Lichtenstein) Philosophers do this because, as Plato and all philosophers have since argued, the only words that have any meaning are names and for a sentence to make sense, all words must be names. Then, through a use of philosophical nominalism, they argue that the word or concept must exist independent of the word itself. For what is a name without a subject? Ergo, philosophers have argued that words such as on must exist independent of the word itself. There are multiple flaws with this line of reasoning.

If all words are names, then what are sentences? A sentence would then be a list of names with no actual content. Its lack of content would have to do with lists of names having an inability to express particulars. Take this list of proper names: Wittgenstein, George Bush, Barack Obama, Tina Fey, Bill Hicks, Venus, Paris. Who do these names refer too? No one can say as they are just names, not particulars. Tina Fey could have been a coffee shop girl or a comedian that appears on television and movies. If all words are names then this list should be a sentence: Indicative, Paris, Fresh, Fudge. However, it is clearly not a sentence. A sentence requires words that are not names and, therefore, do not exist independent of the word. (Lichtenstein)

Further, the nominalist position is untenable. The line of reasoning for the nominalist framework is that on is a name because names are the only words that mean anything. Therefore, ousia is describing a real possession of on (or being). Now ousia can be used to answer question like “what is a chair” and giving the chair some metaphysical quality or, as Plato put it, form. This is then used to support the idea that words have some form or essence independent of the word itself. The argument is circular. One begins by claiming that words are names and therefore exist independent of the word itself and then proves the argument by using a word. This clearly cannot be the case, as one cannot use a word as a name to prove that words true form is that of the name.

Finally, as has already been argued, words gain their meaning through their use in a social context. Believing that words only gain a meaning by referring to a thing falls into the problem of changing words. If words all names for something in particular, then that particular must be what the word already refers to. Yet it is well known that if one were to look at words from two hundred years ago, some have changed in meaning. Dictatorship in the 1850’s often meant a direct democracy (Draper, 58). Now dictatorship means despotic rule of the minority. This change would not have occurred if dictatorship was a name referring to a proper form of dictatorship. Thus, words cannot exist outside of themselves and they cannot all be names.

Having taken apart the nominalist position, it becomes clear that the Greek verb on was abstracted to be an existential quality inherent to humans. As this is the case, then the question of Being falls apart. There is no question of Being, because there is no such thing as Being. Thus the question is pseudo question based on nonsense. By abstracting the word in its nominalized forms, philosophers have created a quality that does not exist in reality. With no question of Being, there is no need for a god to have created Being.

By looking at the word on and how it has been abstracted, one can see how philosophers have distorted the word and created something that does not exist. By dissolving the word into its ordinary usage, the question of Being simply goes away as being a non-question. In exposing the question of Being as being a nonsense question, the foundations of the philosophy of religion, nay ontology itself have been ripped out from beneath them.

Draper, Hal. [I]Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution Volume III: The "Dictatorship of the Proletariat"[I]. 1st. III. New York City, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1986. Print.

Kahn, Charles. The Verb "be" in Ancient Greek. Reprint. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co., 2003. 1-261. Print.[/FONT]

Lichtenstein, Rosa. "Essay Three Part One: Abstractionism -- The Heart Of The Beast." Anti Dialectics. Rosa Lichtenstein.

http://www.anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...70&postcount=1

Slightly edited, since the admins over at RevLeft have blocked all links to my site.

More to follow...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

The above (partially) illustrates why Marx was right to argue as follows:

"One of the most difficult tasks confronting philosophers is to descend from the world of thought to the actual world. Language is the immediate actuality of thought. Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content. The problem of descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world is turned into the problem of descending from language to life.

"We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an independent existence in consequence of the personal circumstances and relations of individuals acquiring independent existence. We have shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence of division of labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a consequence of German petty-bourgeois conditions. The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life."

The German Ideology, bold added.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/mar...logy/ch03p.htm

More to follow...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

In future Essays, I also aim to investigate how these 'ruling ideas' came to dominate thought in both the 'East' and the 'West', using the following works, among others:

Barnes, J. (1982), The Presocratic Philosophers (Routledge, 2nd ed.).

Boas, F. (1965), The Mind Of Primitive Man (The Free Press, revised ed.).

Burkert, W. (1972), Lore And Science In Ancient Pythagoreanism (Harvard University Press).

--------, (1985), Greek Religion, translated by John Raffan (Blackwell).

Burnet, J. (1908), Early Greek Philosophy (Adam and Charles Black, 2nd ed.).

Ching, J. (1983), 'The Mirror Symbol Revisited: Confucian And Taoist Mysticism', in Katz (1983), pp.226-46.

Clark, G., and Rajak, T. (2002) (ed.), Philosophy And Power In The Graeco-Roman World (Oxford University Press).

Colish, M. (1968), The Mirror Of Language. A Study In Medieval Theory Of Knowledge (Yale University Press).

Collins, R. (1998), The Sociologies Of Philosophies. A Global Theory Of Intellectual Change (Harvard University Press).

Cordero, N. (2004), By Being, It Is. The Thesis Of Parmenides (Parmenides Publishing).

Cornford, F. (1951), Principium Sapientiae. A Study Of The Origins Of Greek Philosophical Thought (Harper Torchbooks).

--------, (1957), From Religion To Philosophy. A Study Of The Origins Of Western Speculation (Harper Torchbooks).

Creel, H. (1953), Chinese Thought From Confucius To Mao Tse-Tung (University of Chicago Press).

Curd, P. (2004), The Legacy Of Parmenides. Eleatic Monism And Later Presocratic Thought (Parmenides Publishing)).

Easlea, B. (1980), Witch-Hunting, Magic And The New Philosophy: An Introduction To Debates Of The Scientific Revolution 1450-1750 (Harvester Press).

Ferrarin, A, (2001), Hegel And Aristotle (Cambridge University Press).

Feyerabend, P. (1999), Conquest Of Abundance (University of Chicago Press).

Frankfort, H., Frankfort, H.A., Wilson, J., Jacobsen, T., and Irwin, W. (1977), The Intellectual Adventure Of Ancient Man (University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed.).

Frankfort, H. (1978), Kingship And The Gods (University of Chicago Press).

Gentzler, J. (2001) (ed.), Method In Ancient Philosophy (Oxford University Press).

Gregorios, P. (2002) (ed.), Neoplatonism And Indian Philosophy (State University of New York Press).

Gregory, A. (2000), Plato's Philosophy Of Science (Duckworth).

Haller, R. (1986) (ed.), Non-Existence And Predication (Rodolpi).

Hankinson, R. (1998), Cause And Explanation In Greek Thought (Oxford University Press).

Hannam, J. (2009), God's Philosophers. How The Medieval World Laid The Foundations Of Modern Science (Icon Books).

Hermann, A. (2004), To Think Like God. Pythagoras And Parmenides. The Origins Of Philosophy (Parmenides Publishing).

Hooykaas, R. (1973), Religion And The Rise Of Modern Science (Scottish Academic Press).

Kahn, C. (1994), The Art And Thought Of Heraclitus (Cambridge University Press).

Katz, S. (1978), Mysticism And Philosophical Analysis (Sheldon Press).

--------, (1983) (ed.), Mysticism And Religious Traditions (Oxford University Press).

Kingsley, P. (1996), Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, And Magic. Empedocles And Pythagorean Tradition (Oxford University Press).

Knight, N. (2005), Marxist Philosophy In China From Qu Qiubai To Mao Zedong (Springer-Verlag).

Knuuttila, S., and Hintikka, J. (1986) (eds.), The Logic Of Being. Historical Studies (Reidel).

Kohanski, A. (1984), The Greek Mode of Thought In Western Philosophy (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press)

Liu, J. (2006), An Introduction To Chinese Philosophy. From Ancient Philosophy To Chinese Buddhism. (Blackwell).

Lloyd, G. (1979), Magic, Reason And Experience. Studies In The Origins And Development Of Greek Science (Cambridge University Press).

--------, (1983), Science, Folklore And Ideology (Cambridge University Press).

--------, (1987), The Revolutions Of Wisdom. Studies In The Claims And Practice Of Ancient Greek Science (University of California Press).

--------, (2001), 'Techniques And Dialectic: Method In Greek And Chinese Mathematics And Medicine', in Gentzler (2001), pp.351-76.

--------, (2002), Ambitions Of Curiosity. Understanding The World In Ancient Greece And China (Cambridge University Press).

--------, (2004), Ancient Worlds, Modern Reflections. Philosophical Perspectives On Greek And Chinese Science And Culture (Oxford University Press).

--------, (2007), Cognitive Variations. Reflections On The Unity And Diversity Of The Human Mind (Oxford University Press).

MacFie, A. (2003) (ed.), Eastern Influences On Western Philosophy. A Reader (Edinburgh University Press).

Mercer, C. (2001), Leibniz's Metaphysics. Its Origins And Development (Cambridge University Press).

Meiksins Wood, E. (1988), Peasant, Citizen And Slave. The Foundation Of Athenian Democracy (Verso).

--------, (2008), Citizens To Lords. A Social History Of Western Political Thought From Antiquity To The Middle Ages (Verso).

Meiksins Wood, E., and Wood, N. (1978), Class Ideology And Ancient Political Thought. Socrates, Plato, And Aristotle In Social Context (Blackwell).

Mourelatos, A. (2008), The Route Of Parmenides (Parmenides Publishing, 2nd ed.).

Onians, R. (2000), The Origins Of European Thought About The Body, The Mind, The Soul, The World, Time, And Fate (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed.)

Owen, G. (1966), 'The Platonism Of Aristotle', Proceedings of the British Academy 51, pp.125-50; reprinted in Owen (1986), pp.200-20.

--------, (1986), Logic, Science And Dialectic (Duckworth).

Pelletier, F. (1990), Parmenides, Plato And The Semantics Of Not-Being (Harvard University Press).

Popper, K. (2001), The World Of Parmenides (Routledge).

Rorty, R. (1980), Philosophy And The Mirror Of Nature (Blackwell).

Rubenstein, R. (2003), Aristotle's Children. How Christians, Muslims, And Jews Rediscovered Ancient Wisdom And Illuminated The Dark Ages (Harcourt Books).

Snell, B. (1982), The Discovery Of The Mind In Greek Philosophy And Literature (Dover Books).

Verhaar, j. (1968) (ed.), The Verb 'Be' And Its Synonyms (Reidel).

Vernant, J-P. (1990), Myth And Society In Ancient Greece, translated by Janet Lloyd (Zone Books).

Williams, L. (1980), The Origins Of Field Theory (University Press of America).

Wood, N. (1988), Cicero's Social And Political Thought (University of California Press).

More to follow...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Add to the above, the following:

Caudwell, C. (1949), The Crisis In Physics (The Bodley Head).

--------, (1977), The Concept Of Freedom (Lawrence & Wishart).

Caudwell's work contains an early version of my thesis.

As well as:

Aveni, A. (1996), Behind The Crystal Ball. Magic, Science, And The Occult From Antiquity Through The New Age (Times Books).

--------, (2002), Conversing With The Planets. How Science And Myth Invented The Cosmos (University Press of Colorado).

Beck, L. (1969), Early German Philosophy. Kant And His Predecessors (The Belknap Press).

Bono, J. (1995), The Word Of God And The Language Of Men, Ficino To Descartes, Volume One: Interpreting Nature In Early Modern Science And Medicine (University of Wisconsin Press). [Unfortunately, Volume Two was never published.]

Buchdahl, G. (1967), 'Semantic Sources Of The Concept Of Law', in Cohen and Wartofsky (1967), pp.272-92.

--------, (1969), Metaphysics And The Philosophy Of Science (University Press of America).

Burtt, E. (1954), The Metaphysical Foundations Of Modern Physical Science (Doubleday, 2nd ed.).

Chapman, A. (2002), Gods In The Sky. Astronomy From The Ancients To The Renaissance (Channel Four Books).

Cohen, R., and Wartofsky, M. (1967) (eds.), Essays In Memory Of Norwood Russell Hanson. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume Three (Reidel).

Conger, G. (1967), Theories Of Macrocosms And Microcosms In The History Of Philosophy (Russell & Russell).

Cowley, F. (1991), Metaphysical Delusion (Prometheus Books).

Crossley, P. (1999), A Translucent Mirror. History And Identity In Qing Imperial Ideology (University of California Press).

Danziger, K. (1997), Naming The Mind. How Psychology Found Its Language (Sage Publications).

Debus, A. (1965), The English Paracelsians (Oldbourne Press).

--------, (1977), The Chemical Philosophy: Paracelsian Science And Medicine In The Sixteenth And Seventeenth Centuries, Two Volumes (Science History Publications).

--------, (1978), Man And Nature In The Renaissance (Cambridge University Press).

--------, (1987), Chemistry, Alchemy And The New Philosophy, 1550-1700 (Variorum Reprints).

--------, (1991), The French Paracelsians (Cambridge University Press).

Eamon, S. (1994), Science And The Secrets Of Nature (Princeton University Press).

Faivre, A. (1994), Access To Western Esotericism (State University of New York Press).

--------, (1995), The Eternal Hermes. From Greek God To Alchemical Magus (Phanes Press).

--------, (2000), Theosophy, Imagination, Tradition. Studies In Western Esotericism (State University of New York Press).

Fowden, G. (1993), The Egyptian Hermes. A Historical Approach To The Late Pagan Mind (Princeton University Press, 2nd ed.).

Harrington, A. (1996), Reenchanted Science: Holism In German Culture From Wilhelm II To Hitler (Princeton University Books).

Harrison, J. E. (1989), Themis. A Study Of The Social Origins Of Greek Religion (Merlin Press, 2nd ed.).

Henry, J. (1986), 'Occult Qualities And The Experimental Philosophy: Active Principles In Pre-Newtonian Matter Theory', History of Science 24, pp.335-81.

--------, (2002), Knowledge Is Power. How Magic, The Government And An Apocalyptic Vision Inspired Francis Bacon To Create Modern Science (Icon Books).

Hesse, M. (1961), Forces And Fields (Littlefield, Adams & Co.).

Ishiguro, H. (1972), Leibniz's Philosophy Of Logic And Language (Cornell University Press)

Jacob, M. (2006), The Radical Enlightenment. Pantheists, Freemasons And Republicans (Cornerstone Press, 2nd ed.).

Jammer, M. (1993), Concepts Of Space (Dover Books).

--------, (1997), Concepts Of Mass (Dover Books).

--------, (1999), Concepts Of Force (Dover Books, 2nd ed.)

Katz, D. (2005), The Occult Tradition. From The Renaissance To The Present Day (Jonathan Cape).

Kaye, J. (1998), Economy And Nature In The Fourteenth Century. Money, Market Exchange, And The Emergence Of Scientific Thought (Cambridge University Press).

Krupp, E. (1997), Skywatchers, Shamans And Kings. Astronomy And The Archaeology Of Power (John Wiley).

Leibniz, G. (1951), Leibniz Selections, edited by Philip Wiener (Scribner's).

--------, (1989), Philosophical Essays (Hackett Publishing Company).

--------, (1992), Discourse On Metaphysics And Other Essays: On The Ultimate Origination Of Things; Preface To The New Essays; The Monadology (Hackett Publishing Company)

--------, (1996), New Essays On Human Understanding, edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge University Press).

--------, (2001), The Labyrinth Of The Continuum. Writings on The Continuum Problem, 1672-1686, edited and translated by R. Taylor (Yale University Press).

Lovejoy, A. (1964), The Great Chain Of Being (Harvard University Press).

Marshall, P. (2001), The Philosopher's Stone. A Quest For The Secrets Of Alchemy (Pan Books).

McGuire, J. (1967), 'Transmutation And Immutability: Newton's Doctrine Of Physical Qualities', Ambix 14, 2, pp.69-95.

--------, (1968), 'Force, Active Principles and Newton's Invisible Realm', Ambix 15, , pp.154-208.

McGuire, J., and Rattansi, P. (1966), 'Newton And The "Pipes Of Pan"', Notes And Records Of The Royal Society Of London 21, pp.108-43.

Miles, M. (2003), Inroads. Paths In Ancient And Modern Western Philosophy (University of Toronto Press).

Needham, J. (1951a), 'Human Laws And Laws Of Nature In China And The West (1)', Journal of the History of Ideas 12, 1, pp.3-32; revised version reprinted in Needham (1979), pp.299-331.

--------, (1951b), 'Human Laws And Laws Of Nature In China And The West (2)', Journal of the History of Ideas 12, pp.194-230; revised version reprinted in Needham (1979), pp.299-331.

--------, (1968), Order And Life (MIT Press).

--------, (1971), 'The Refiner's Fire: The Enigma Of Alchemy In East And West' (Birkbeck College Lecture).

--------, (1974), Science And Civilisation In China, Volume Five Part Two (Cambridge University Press).

--------, (1979), The Grand Titration. Science And Society In East And West (University of Toronto Press).

Newman, W., and Grafton, A. (2001) (eds.), Secrets Of Nature. Astrology And Alchemy In Early Modern Europe (MIT Press).

Newman, W., and Principe, L. (2005), Alchemy Tried In The Fire. Starkey, Boyle, And The Fate Of Helmontian Chymistry (University of Chicago Press).

Osler, M. (2004), Divine Will And The Mechanical Philosophy. Gassendi And Descartes On Contingency And Necessity In The Created World (Cambridge University Press).

Perkins, F. (2004), Leibniz And China. A Commerce Of Light (Cambridge University Press).

Richards, R. (2002), The Romantic Conception Of Life. Science And Philosophy In The Age Of Goethe (University of Chicago Press).

Russell, C. (1973) (ed.), Science And Religious Belief (Open University Books).

Tugendhat, E. (1982), Traditional And Analytic Philosophy. Lectures On The Philosophy of Language (Cambridge University Press).

Walker, D. (1972), The Ancient Theology (Duckworth).

--------, (2000), Spiritual And Demonic Magic From Ficino To Campanella (Pennsylvania State University Press).

Webster, C. (1976), The Great Instauration (Duckworth).

--------, (1982), From Paracelsus To Newton: Magic And The Making Of Modern Science (Cambridge University Press).

Westman, R., and McGuire, J. (1977), Hermeticism And The Scientific Revolution (William Andrews Clark Memorial Library).

Wright, J., and Potter, P. (2000), Psyche And Soma. Physicians And Metaphysicians On The Mid-Body Problem From Antiquity To Enlightenment (Oxford University Press).

Yates, F. (1991), Giordano Bruno And The Hermetic Tradition (University of Chicago Press).

--------, (2001), The Occult Philosophy In The Elizabethan Age (Routledge).

--------, (2004), The Rosicrucian Enlightenment (Routledge).

More to follow...

[Amoeba]

You should add some Skinner and Pocock and the many folks working in their tradition if you want to delve into intellectual history, which it seems like you do.

Skinner's critique of Lovejoy is a 'classic' in the field: http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/ic...of%20Ideas.pdf

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Add to that, the following:

Boylan, P. (1922), Thoth. The Hermes Of Egypt (Oxford University Press).

Conner, C. (2005), A People's History Of Science. Miners, Midwives And "Low Mechanicks" (Nation Books).

De Ste. Croix, G. (1981), The Class Struggle In The Ancient Greek World (Duckworth).

Faivre, A., and Hanegraff, W. (1998) (eds.), Western Esotericism And The Science Of Religion (Peeters).

Hopkins, J. (1985), Nicholas Of Cusa's Dialectical Mysticism. Text, Translation, And Interpretative Study Of De Visione Dei (Banning Press).

Malinowski, B. (1954), Magic, Science And Religion (Doubleday Anchor).

Matthew, G. et al (1999) (eds.) The Rosicrucian Enlightenment (Lindisfarne Books).

Nicolescu, B. (1991), Science, Meaning, And Evolution. The Cosmology Of Jacob Boehme (Parabola Books).

Petry, R. (1957) (ed.), Late Medieval Mysticism (SCM Press).

Shumaker, W. (1972), The Occult Sciences In The Renaissance (University of California Press).).

Vickers, B. (1984a) (ed.), Occult And Scientific Mentalities In The Renaissance (Cambridge University Press).

--------, (1984b), 'Analogy Versus Identity: The Rejection Of Occult Symbolism', in Vickers (1984a), pp.95-163

Weeks, A. (1991), Boehme. An Intellectual Biography Of The Seventeenth-Century Philosopher And Mystic (State University of New York Press).

--------, (1993), German Mysticism From Hildegard Of Bingen To Ludwig Wittgenstein (State University of New York Press).

[I'll add more if any others occur to me.]

I will be using the above, and other sources already listed at my site (plus any more that I come across over the next few years as I further research this topic), to show that Marx was right when he argued:

"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch...."

The division of labour, which we already saw above as one of the chief forces of history up till now, manifests itself also in the ruling class as the division of mental and material labour, so that inside this class one part appears as the thinkers of the class (its active, conceptive ideologists, who make the perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood), while the others’ attitude to these ideas and illusions is more passive and receptive, because they are in reality the active members of this class and have less time to make up illusions and ideas about themselves. Within this class this cleavage can even develop into a certain opposition and hostility between the two parts, which, however, in the case of a practical collision, in which the class itself is endangered, automatically comes to nothing, in which case there also vanishes the semblance that the ruling ideas were not the ideas of the ruling class and had a power distinct from the power of this class. The existence of revolutionary ideas in a particular period presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class; about the premises for the latter sufficient has already been said above.

If now in considering the course of history we detach the ideas of the ruling class from the ruling class itself and attribute to them an independent existence, if we confine ourselves to saying that these or those ideas were dominant at a given time, without bothering ourselves about the conditions of production and the producers of these ideas, if we thus ignore the individuals and world conditions which are the source of the ideas, we can say, for instance, that during the time that the aristocracy was dominant, the concepts honour, loyalty, etc. were dominant, during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts freedom, equality, etc. The ruling class itself on the whole imagines this to be so. This conception of history, which is common to all historians, particularly since the eighteenth century, will necessarily come up against the phenomenon that increasingly abstract ideas hold sway, i.e. ideas which increasingly take on the form of universality. For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones. The class making a revolution appears from the very start, if only because it is opposed to a class, not as a class but as the representative of the whole of society; it appears as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class. ”

The German Ideology

Bold added.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/mar...logy/ch01b.htm

On this, see:

Shaw, W., (1989), 'Ruling Ideas', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, Analyzing Marxism, edited by Robert Wise and Kai Nielsen, pp.425-48 (University of Calgary Press).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for that, A!

Haven't you recommended this work of Skinner's before?